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LAW AND THE COMING ENVIRONMENTAL CATASTROPHE
BRUCE LEDEWITZ* AND ROBERT D. TAYLOR"
INTRODUCTION
We live in a time of critical uncertainty about the environment. We
literally do not know whether our way of life will come crashing down within
the relatively near future. Science is, or at least is reported to be, divided on
the issue. Politicians seem determined to avoid the subject altogether, as
witnessed by the Presidential "Non-Campaign" of 1996. This reluctance is
understandable because solutions to address the catastrophe would be painful
and might not even work. The fundamental environmental problem may be
just too many people.
This paper is not about efforts to convince people that the
environmental threat is real. That threat forms the background for the paper.
We assume the catastrophe is coming and ask how law is responding to it.
We acknowledge that we do not know with certainty whether we are in
serious danger. Furthermore, we will not know for certain until the point at
which it would be too late to respond, if the danger turned out to be real.
That gap between knowledge and response time is why we look to law now.
We will put our conclusion here, at the beginning. Law's response to
the threat of environmental catastrophe has been mild-almost no response
at all. The nation's law schools have not turned serious attention to the crisis,
and law has not responded substantively either. Environmental law has no
sense of urgency about the environment. In addition, constitutional law,
which has never evolved an environmental ethic, either stands mute in the
face of looming crisis, or serves as a minor impediment to coping with the
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crisis. Fundamentally, we lawyers, law teachers, and law students go on
about our business as if all were well.
This non-response will prove to have been wise if it turns out that the
environmentalists were overreacting and that all was well. If not, the non-
response of law will be condemned. We believe that the threat is very real.
In that sense, writing this paper is as much witness as argument. If the
catastrophe turns out to be real, everyone and every discipline will be judged
by future generations based on our reactions today. If law turns out to be
insignificant in this hour, or worse, blind and burdensome in the face of this
crisis, the legal profession will be consigned to history's dustbin. The
profession's insights and gifts will be judged worthless because it did not
respond to humanity's greatest threat. Those of us alive in twenty-five years
to witness the fruits of this generation's actions, will be asked by our
grandchildren why we acted, or failed to act, as we did.
I. THE COMING ENVIRONMENTAL CATASTROPHE
The United Nations Environment Program's report on January 27,
1997, stated that, globally, human society is heading "towards an
environmental precipice."' The report mentioned several factors as
contributing to the interrelated problems.2  Irreplaceable, renewable
resources, such as land, fresh water, and air are being used or degraded
beyond their capacity for natural renewal.3 Wilderness and biodiversity are
diminishing under pressure from agriculture and expanding human
population.4 The increasing use of chemicals is posing serious health risks,5
and unplanned urbanization is causing deterioration in adjacent ecosystems.6
UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, GEO-1, (forthcoming 1997) (Also
available on the Internet. See United Nations Environment Program, GEO-I (visited April
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The report notes that while some efforts have been made to address these
problems, the responses have been slow and insufficient.7 The report
recommends more foreign aid, which does not seem to be forthcoming, in
order to help distribute environmentally sound technology.8
Of particular concern, especially given the subject of this paper, is the
effect of destroying forests to build shopping centers and other new
developments.9 The reduction of tree and other natural cover has led not
only to increasing levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, thus
contributing to global warming, but also to serious erosion of soil.'°
Throughout the world, since 1972, some 500 million acres
have been turned into deserts; and farmers have lost 480
million tons of topsoil, more than all of the topsoil on all US
farmland. In recent years, growth in grain yields has not been
making up for losses in grain growing land."'
The estimated rate of deforestation in the world is sobering--one percent of
forest disappears every year.'2 At that rate, the world will be denuded of
forest within the lifespan of children born today. 3 Aside from its other
effects, deforestation is linked directly to the loss of habitat that is forcing
many species to the brink of extinction: more than ten percent of all bird
7 See id.
8 See id.
' A survey of newspaper articles shows the prevalence of the practice. See. e.g., Linda
Stahl, Okolona Residents Unite to Fight Centers Shopping, Business Developments are
Proposed, COURIER-J. (Louisville), Feb. 5, 1997, at IN, available in 1996 WL 12760318;
Frank B. Williams, Studio City Company Fined for Cutting Down Oak Trees, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 27, 1996 at B3, available in 1997 WL 6632914.
0 See Daniel J. Kevles, Endangered Environmentalists, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 20,
1997, at 30, 30 (citing Gary Gardner, Shrinking Fields: Cropland Loss in a World of Eight
Billion, WORLDWATCH PAPER 131 (1996) (Worldwatch Inst., Washington, D.C.)).
Id.
12 See WORLDWATCH MAG., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at back cover (citing figures provided by
the World Wide Fund for Nature).
"3 See generally id.
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species and nearly one fourth of all mammal species are so threatened.' 4
There is also the threat of ozone depletion. 5 Just in the last few
months it has been reported that the level of stratospheric ozone over
Antarctica had dropped by forty-five to seventy-five percent by September,
1996 and that the resulting ozone hole covered the tip of Argentina a month
earlier than in recent years;' 6 that Hawaii experienced a forty percent increase
in ultraviolet light during the winter of 1994-1995 because the layer of
stratospheric ozone over it reached a record low;' 7 that ozone depletion over
Antarctica now is causing observable adverse effects on wildlife in the area;' 8
and that overall in 1995 ozone depletion was at record levels over northern
middle latitudes. 19
The environmental threat that probably most engages the attention of
people is the trend toward global warming. The reason for this may be that
unlike the other environmental threats, people readily can understand how
global warming threatens them. This is ironic because it may turn out that
short-term disasters involving weather have little or nothing to do with global
warming, although this is becoming less likely with every passing year.2"
People are quick to assume that disasters such as the deaths of 527
people in Chicago during the extreme heat wave of the summer of 1995 were
t See id. at 7.
' See Earthweek: Diary of the Planet for the Week Ending 12 July 1996, TORONTO
STAR, July 15, 1996, at C7, available in 1996 WL 3376316.
"6 See Steve Newman, Earthwatch: A Diary of the Planet, EDMONTON J., Sept. 15,
1996, at F7, available in 1996 WL 5147446.
17 See Earthweek: Diary of the Planet for the Week Ending 12 July 1996, supra note
15, at C7.
8 See Earthwatch: A Diary of the Planet, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1997, at B2, available
in 1997 WL 2184023.
"9 See Steve Newman, Earthweek: Diary of the Planet, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 5, 1995,
at C6, available in 1995 WL 6029001.
20 See infra text accompanying notes 22-29.
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caused by global warming.2 No such direct link can be established.
On the other hand, the evidence of global warming on a worldwide
scale continues to mount. In May of 1996, the World Meteorological Agency
announced that 1995 was the hottest year in recorded history.22 James
Hansen, who records world temperature for the National Aeronautics Space
Administration ("NASA") confirmed this finding in July 1996.23 The effects
of such warming are observable, from the retreat of the Canadian permafrost
in the Mackenzie Basin by about 100 miles during the past 100 years24 to the
collapse of a forty-eight by twenty-two mile piece of the Larsen Ice Shelf in
Antarctica in January, 1996.5
Public appreciation of the danger of global warming was enhanced
dramatically in September 1995, when parts of a draft report by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ("IPCC"), a United Nations
("U.N.") sponsored body of 1500 climate experts, somehow found its way
onto the Internet.26 The report suggested increasing scientific consensus that
presently global warming was having serious weather consequences and that
during the next century a host of weather-related problems would be likely
to occur, including floods, hurricanes, droughts and coastal inundation.27
21 See, e.g., Charles Arthur, Experts Warn Fossil Fuels Must be Curbed, INDEPENDENT
(London), Dec. 1, 1995, at 17, available in 1995 WL 10816507 (citing the heatwave in
Chicago as evidence that global warming is increasing); Philip Eden, The Weather: Phew,
the Hottest July for 12 Months, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Jul. 23, 1995, at 28, available
in 1995 WL 8021033.
2 See Steve Newman, Earthwatch: A Diary of the Planet, EDMONTON J., May 5, 1996,
at F7, available in 1996 WL 5127682.
23 See J. Hansen et al., Global Surface Air Temperature in 1995. Return to Pre-
Pinatubo Level, 23 GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH LETTERS 1666, 1667.
24 See Steve Newman, Earthweek: Diary of the Planet for the Week Ending 14 June
1996, TORONTO STAR, Jun. 18, 1996, at C6, available in 1996 WL 3371682.
"5 See Fiona McWilliam, Antarctica Loses Ice Shelves, GEOGRAPHICAL MAGAZINE,
Mar. 1, 1996, at 7, available in 1996 WL 13219660.
2 See Scientists Seem to Think Warming Has Begun, GLOBAL WARMING NETWORK
ONLINETODAY, Oct. 18, 1995, available in 1995 WL 2266137.
" See id.; William K. Stevens, Scientists See Warmer Earth Causing Major
Disruptions; Focus: Global Warming, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Sept. 19, 1995, at B 1, available
in 1995 WL 6982448.
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When the IPCC issued its final report in December 1995, it stated flatly that
recent rises in temperature could not be blamed on anything but human
causes.18  In January 1996, public perceptions were heightened when
Newsweek carried an extensive cover story blaming global warming not only
for increased heat, but also for more intense winter storms, a more
controversial claim. 9
The sort of haphazard reporting presented above does not, of course,
prove anything. It is our intention only to show the potential seriousness of
the present situation and that reasonable people might well believe that
humanity faces unprecedented peril. The question now becomes, what is
law's role in view of this danger?
II. LAW'S RESPONSE To THE CRISIS
This paper is an example of what Professor James Huffman has called
"apocalyptic environmentalism."3 That is, it assumes facts of which we
cannot be certain-that humans are in danger of rendering the world either
uninhabitable or barely habitable-and then insists that people respond as if
the danger were true.3' Indeed, that is precisely what we aim to do. Taking
seriously Professor Huffman's term, "apocalypse," it would be hard to act in
any other way. It would be natural to expect law to respond on all levels to
a potential apocalypse. Of course, if one is skeptical that any such disaster
is imminent, one would oppose any course of dramatic action. However,
from the perspective of approaching apocalypse, law's reaction looks meager.
Law has responded on three levels to environmental problems in
28 See REPORT BY THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, U.N.
GAOR, 11 th Sess., Agenda Item 7(b) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237183 (1995). "[E]missions
of certain radiatively active gases that result from human activities are substantially
increasing the atmospheric concentrations of these gases and that these increases will cause
additional warming of the earth's surface." Id. para. 42.
29 See David A. Kaplan, This is Global Warming?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 22, 1996, at 20.
30 James L. Huffman, Civilization in the Balance: Comments on Senator Al Gore's
Earth in the Balance, 23 ENVTL. L. 233, 233 (1993) (book review).
" See id.
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general and to the coming environmental crisis in particular: through
teaching, through imaginative projection, and through substance. We
examine each of these below, in turn.
A. The Teachings of Law
Although the content of law itself has a pedagogical effect, we are
referring here to a narrower subject. We are looking primarily at the work of
law teachers, both in class and in the wider world. The primary
environmental impact of law teaching has been to introduce thousands of law
students to the problems of the environment through courses in
environmental law and related subjects. While the following comments are
not meant as an exhaustive survey of environmental law materials, they are
an accurate overview of the tendencies of the field.
Judging by the mainstream environmental law textbooks, there is a
certain shared ideology in these courses. For example, one way or another,
the books introduce the student to the science of ecology and what might be
called the environmental perspective.32 We do not mean that the books,
courses, and teachers share a conclusion as to what should be done about
environmental problems. One of the important dividing lines in the
environmental field concerns the proper role of market solutions, for
example. Generally, however, all of the courses will use The Tragedy of the
Commons33 to bring students to the awareness that natural resources are not
inexhaustible, that a regime of total non-regulation can lead to serious
environmental harms, and that these harms are potentially more dangerous
than students may think at first. This approach, which could be labeled the
"moderate environmental ethic," sensitizes the student to environmental
threats, but also assumes that the world is a "resource" for people to use
rather than an intrinsically valuable, functioning system, to which humans
32 See, e.g., ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW
SCIENCE AND POLICY, 1-70 (2d ed. 1996); THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM AND RONALD H.
ROSENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND READINGS, 1-17 (3d
ed. 1996). There are a number of such books that are similar on these points.
" See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
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have no inherent right of access.34
Some environmental law materials go beyond the moderate
environmental ethic, introducing a more radical environmental ethic, such as
assessing and attacking the "wise use movement"3 5 or introducing issues of
intergenerational equity, overpopulation, ozone depletion, global warming
and biological diversity36 -all the components of the coming environmental
catastrophe. What is potentially radical in such material is not just the subject
matter, but also its sense of urgency.
Overall, however, one could not consider the contribution of law
schools to students' environmental awareness to be substantial. In the first
place, most environmental law courses are of the moderate viewpoint. In
addition, the subject of environmental law remains a fringe item-not bar
testable and generally not considered essential to a legal education.
Environment (or nature) has not been added to will, autonomy, efficiency,
society or order as a fundamental organizing principle for law. Law schools
are not organized around the theme of the environment.
Law teachers teach in ways other than just the classroom, of course.
Many members of the legal academy are involved heavily in efforts to deal
with the issues of global warming and other interrelated, pressing
environmental problems, mostly through legal writing." Some of these
works have been quite influential.38 Some of these works have passionately
3 See generally id.
'5 See, e.g., ZYGMUNT J. B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY:
NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY, 17-18 (Supplement to 1992 edition, 1994). The movement
urges less governmental regulation of environmental affairs. See id.
36 See, e.g., WEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, chs. 3, 8, and 9
(1994).
37 A recent computer-aided search of the phrase "global warming" in the law review
data base yielded 379 entries, most of which turned out to be articles by law teachers in the
United States and abroad, of recent vintage and of high quality, attempting to deal with the
severe environmental problems we face. The list also contained some fine student work.
See, e.g., Adam L. Aronson, Note, From "Cooperator's Loss" To Cooperative Gain:
Negotiating Greenhouse Gas Abatement, 102 YALE L. J. 2143 (1993).
" See, e.g., Christopher D. Stone, Beyond Rio: "Insuring" Against Global Warming
86 AM. J. INT'L L. 445 (1992).
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proposed new visions for the relationship of law to the environment.3 9
It is not in denigration of this body of work that we point out that it
does not reflect "Teachings of Law." By the phrase "Teachings of Law," we
mean a reflection of the professional norms of law. Expressions of
environmental concern, whatever their particular content, do not do that.
To see this, imagine a symposium among American lawyers
concerning the exclusionary rule.4 ° Although there would be strong
disagreements about the rule's utility and desirability, there would be an
identifiable and widely shared consensus among the lawyers that under some
circumstances guilty persons will be protected properly by procedures
designed in general to protect the innocent. This consensus would not be
shared, at least to the same extent, however, by a collection of Americans
taken at random.
The reader easily can repeat the above thought-experiment in realms
of individual liberty and procedural regularity because these are areas in
which the professional norms of law are well developed. In contrast, the only
professional norm that American law associates with nature is the fostering
of private property.
The teachers of environmental law have failed to generate a consistent
environmental perspective within the legal profession. Again, we do not
mean that lawyers should be expected to agree about the "what to do" issues,
but lawyers could be expected to share a realization of the importance of the
environment and the vulnerability of human institutions. Thus far, this
realization is lacking. At this late hour, law still lacks an environmental
J See. e.g., Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law as a Mirror of the Future: Civic
Values Confronting Market Force Dynamics in a Time of Counter-Revolution, 23 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 733 (1996) (examining the relationship between public civic values and
environmental law); David E. Decosse, Beyond Law and Economics: Theological Ethics and
the Regulatory Takings Clause, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 829 (1996) (analyzing
regulatory takings through a Roman Catholic theology).
40 The exclusionary rule limits the admission of evidence obtained in violation of a
criminal defendant's constitutional rights. See generally Won Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471 (1963).
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norm.
41
B. Law's Imagined Future
One way that law both illustrates and changes its understanding of the
universe is by projection into the future. Thus, with regard to the
environment, it can be asked, what does law imagine the environmental
future to be like?
The reader may suppose that there will be as many imagined futures
as there are writers of law documents, but this is the case only insignificantly,
in details. A look at any judicial opinion concerned with the future, such as
Mapp v. Ohio,42 shows law's assumption that the future will be basically like
the present. For example, it is assumed by all the Justices in Mapp that there
will not be a military coup on the one hand or the kind of breakdown in
public order, on the other, that would render the niceties of constitutional
criminal procedure irrelevant.
It appears that law is not yet concerned about what the environmental
future holds. Environmental law casebooks, for example, do not devote
chapters to the subject, with titles such as "Law in an Age of Environmental
Catastrophe." Judicial opinions do not address the subject; nor, by and large,
do law review articles.
There are some exceptions to these observations. In the law review
field, in which one would expect to find more imaginative projections than
in case law, there have been several efforts to deal with a serious
environmental breakdown in the relatively near future. For example, in 1991,
Professor Robert Fischman envisioned the effect of rising sea levels on
attempts to protect costal wetlands.43 Significantly, Professor Fischman
introduced his subject as "an example of the challenge that global warming
41 Except, that is, for the fostering of private property alluded to above, which we do
not consider to be an "environmental" norm.
42 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule against the states).
43 See Robert L. Fischman, Global Warming and Property Interests: Preserving
Coastal Wetlands as Sea Levels Rise, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 565 (1991).
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presents to American property law."'  Thus, one could imagine a spate of
articles with titles such as, The New Regime of Beachfront Property Law in
Nevada. Although this suggestion is lighthearted, it is true that the power of
law's imagined future lies in its focus on the ordinary details of legal life.
These ordinary details remind us, in a memorable way, of the severity of the
problems that we face.
A more dramatic example of this power of projection is Dr. Ranee
Khooshie Lal Panjabi's criticism, in 1993, of the "world's polluting
nations"45 for their failure to take seriously the "disaster just waiting to
happen"'46 to the peoples of low lying areas in the world, most of whom, he
wrote, are vulnerable and unable to defend themselves. 7 It is these islands
and low-lying areas that simply will disappear within a relatively short time. 8
In terms ofjudicial opinions, there have not been many opportunities
for consideration of what global warming may portend. One exception is
City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration .4 In
National Highway, California cities, the State of California, and the Natural
Resources Defense Council ("NRDC") sued the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration ("NHTSA") over its decision not to prepare
environmental impact statements covering its setting of certain corporate
average fuel economy standards."
The most important aspect of the case for our purposes was the
court's divided decisions, first, that the NRDC had standing to challenge the
model year 1989 standard, but, second, that on the merits the decision of the
Id. at 565.
4' Ranee Khooshie Lal Panjabi, Can International Law Improve the Climate? An
Analysis of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Signed at the Rio
Summit in 1992, 18 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 491, 533 (1993).
46 Id. at 532.
47 See id.; see also Durwood Zaelke & James Cameron, Global Warming and Climate
Change-An Overview of the International Legal Process, 5 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 249
(1990).
4 See Panjabi, supra note 45, at 532-36.
49 912 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
'o See id. at 482.
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NHTSA not to issue the environmental impact statement was not improper.5'
The panel divided, with Chief Judge Wald and then-Judge Ruth Ginsburg
holding that the NRDC had standing and Judges Ruth Ginsburg and D.H.
Ginsburg next holding that no impact statement had been necessary.52
The standing and merits determinations in National Highway were
related. In both, the question essentially was, would the fuel economy
standards set by the agency cause environmental harm by way of global
warming? 53  If so, the plaintiff would have standing to sue and an
environmental impact statement should have been issued.
Chief Judge Wald and Judge D.H. Ginsburg differed about whether
the petition should be partially granted or denied, but they also seemed to
disagree about the dangers of global warming. 4 To be sure, Judge Ginsburg
set forth the plaintiffs allegations about global warming, but then described
the harm as "the environmental nightmare [the plaintiff] hypothesizes."55
Furthermore, Judge Ginsburg stated, the decision to set fuel standards at 26.5
miles per gallon rather than 27.5 miles per gallon would generate so small "a
contribution to the quantum [of greenhouse gases] necessary to produce the
projected catastrophe" that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the
decision. 6
In contrast to Judge Ginsburg, Chief Judge Wald not only made the
point that a continuation of global warming poses an imminent threat to our
environment, but, in response to the argument that the added levels of gases
5' See id.
52 The opinion stated that the government agency had not behaved in an arbitrary and
capricious manner in finding that its setting of fuel standards would have no "significant
environmental effect." Id. at 490.
" See id. at 482.
See id. at 483-85, 493-95.
" Id. at 483. We acknowledge that we impliedly are criticizing Judge Ginsburg for
stating what we ourselves state above, that no one can be sure that global warming and the
other aspects of the environmental crisis are in fact happening. We think, though, there is
an important difference between taking action in light of a threat and forestalling action
because of uncertainty. Judge Ginsburg at least should acknowledge that this particular
hypothesis is not going to be proved or disproved until it is too late to take effective action.
" See id. at 484.
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at issue in the case were simply so small as to be "but an insignificant
tributary to the causal stream leading to the overall harm,",57 Judge Wald
stated that "the evidence in the record suggests that we cannot afford to
ignore even modest contributions to global warming."58
The judges disagreed about the severity and imminence of the global
warming disaster. A small contribution to an imminent calamity is much
more likely to gain judicial attention than is a small contribution to something
uncertain. Unfortunately, the opinions in National Highway did not describe
the disagreement sufficiently to have clarified the differing views about
global warming. Still, the case moves a step towards forcing law to take a
stand with regard to the truth of claims about the peril we face. Law
inevitably may be forced to confront its assumption that the future will be
more or less like the past. Perhaps law can project crisis.
C. Law's Substance
How has law responded substantively to the coming environmental
catastrophe? Here, one must distinguish between positive responses - those
aspects of law that attempt to deal with the environmental crisis-and
negative responses, which are those aspects of law that prevent or retard
dealing with it.59 In the positive vein, or at least potentially positive, are
environmental law itself, common law, and constitutional law, both federal
and state. In the negative vein are limits on standing and the takings clause.
Environmental law constitutes law's primary response to the danger
of environmental catastrophe. The American public law of environmental
protection, as opposed to the common law approach of nuisance,6" for
example, is commonly dated from the. enactment of the National
I ld. (Wald, C.J., dissenting)
5I Id. at 501 (Wald, C.J., dissenting)
5 We do not intend this terminology to be a substitute for "good" and "bad."
Obviously, a positive response to the environmental crisis would be bad if it entailed broad
loss of human liberty.
o See generally E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The
Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 313 (1985).
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Environmental Policy Act of 1969.6" Earlier statutes also have proven to be
significant either directly or indirectly in terms of global warming and other
environmental issues.62
A number of current domestic laws bear on the major threats to the
environment. For example, Congress gave the Environmental Protection
Agency broad authority to limit chlorofluorocarbons ("CFC's") in the 1977
Clean Air Act Amendments.63 The 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act
added a new program for the regulation of acid rain.' Biodiversity is
promoted by section seven of the Endangered Species Act.65
Large-scale threats to the environment of the type considered in this
paper generally are not treated by domestic environmental law. That is,
despite the existence of broad domestic regulatory programs, the general
assumption is that global environmental threats must be dealt with at an
international level.66 In fact, there have been notable successes at this level,
61 Pub. L. No. 91-90, 83 Stat. 852 (1969) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321- 4370d
(1994)).
62 William Rodgers, Jr. nominated three provisions in earlier laws as part of his "seven
statutory wonders:" Food Additives Amendment of 1858 § 409, 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A)
(1988) (banning carcinogens as food additives); Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of
1965 § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 4601-4605 (1988) (establishing a special fund for the acquisition of
parks and conservation lands); and the Wilderness Act of 1964 § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c)
(1988) (defining wilderness as an area where man "does not remain"). Id. Others might have
added the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (1994).
63 Pub. L. No. 95-70, 91 Stat. 277 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 792);
see also PERCIVAL, supra note 32, at 1274.
4 Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2529 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (1994)).
65 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
The typical environmental law textbook deals with domestic hazardous wastes,
domestic water, and air pollution and then suddenly will shift to a global perspective to
discuss the emerging threats of ozone depletion, population growth, global warming,
deforestation, and so forth. See, e.g., SCHOENBAUM & ROSENBERG, supra note 32. This
organizational approach obscures the extent to which these problems are not entirely global.
For example, some nations, notably the industrialized states, particularly the United States,
contribute far. more to these problems than do other nations. For another example of a
somewhat misleading global perspective, focusing on deforestation in tropical forests, but
avoiding the issue of deforestation in the United States, see Donald A. Brown, Thinking
Globally and Acting Locally. The Emergence of Global Environmental Problems and the
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including the 1987 United Nations Montreal Protocol, which called for a
freeze on the production and consumption of CFC's and halons at 1986 levels
in the industrialized nations followed by a ten-year, fifty percent reduction.67
Unfortunately, compared to the specific threat to the ozone layer, the
threat of global warming has not led to similarly specific international
commitments. In the first place, not everyone agrees that warming is taking
place, or if it is, to what extent,68 nor do people agree whether such warming
in any event would be bad for humans, or whether expensive precautions
would be advantageous and/or cost effective.69 Secondly, the complexity of
the problem assures that no one step will be a solution.
Nevertheless, some steps to deal with global warming have been
taken internationally. In June 1992, representatives from more than 150
governments signed the Framework Convention on Climate Change at the
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro.7" The convention took effect on March 21,
1994, after having been ratified by fifty-five signatories.7 Unfortunately, the
convention was not a legally binding agreement to reduce, or even hold
current, the atmospheric level of greenhouse gases. It is unclear when an
actual global warming treaty will be negotiated.72
Overall, environmental law has made an unquestionable contribution
Critical Need to Develop Sustainable Development Programs at State and Local Levels in
the United States, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. POL'Y 175, 191-92 (1996).
67 See United Nations: Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 26
I.L.M. 1541 (1987). The Montreal Protocol occurred on September 16, 1987, and the
protocol entered into force January 1, 1989. The Protocol was strengthened in 1990. See
generally Dale S. Bryk, The Montreal Protocol and Recent Developments to Protect the
Ozone Layer, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 275 (1991).
" See Christopher D. Stone, The Global Warming Crisis, If There Is One, and the Law,
5 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 497 (1990).
"9 See PERCIVAL, supra note 32, at 1295-98 (referring to a number of these matters).
70 See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework
Convention, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992). The Convention on Biological Diversity also was agreed
to in Rio in June 1992; see also Brown, supra note 66, at 192-93 (summarizing the goals of
the convention).
7' See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Environmental Policy and Federal Structure:
A Comparison of the United States and Germany, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1687, 1689 (1994).
72 See Aronson, supra note 37, at 2149.
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to attempts to deal with all sorts of serious environmental problems.
Conversely, if the question is one of urgency and focus, then it is evident that
no straightforward statutory regime exists either to prevent the coming
environmental crisis or to deal with its consequences.
This should come as no surprise. Law, whether enacted by statute,
regulation, or treaty, tends to track closely society's collective values." The
political will to deal with the possibly dark environmental future does not yet
exist. The American public continues to live in an optimistic dream world,
lulled into false confidence by corporate assurances that no environmental
catastrophe is imminent. Until that political climate changes, American
public environmental law will remain important but limited.
Another aspect of law's substantive response to environmental issues
is common law, basically private and public nuisance law. Nuisance law is
important in environmental law today, in the area of just compensation for a
taking of private property. The reason for this importance is that a property
owner could never demand compensation based on the continuation of a
nuisance.74 We will return below to that aspect of nuisance law. Here, we
ask a different question-not, could nuisance law serve to allow regulation,
but could the common law of nuisance itself help to protect people from the
coming environmental catastrophe?
Whether particular conduct qualifies as a private nuisance depends
primarily on whether "the gravity of the harm caused outweighs the utility of
the conduct."" If particular uses of property harm the property interests of
others by causing global warming, for example, the property owner should
be liable, just as the owner would be liable if his smelting operations
7 See John W. Ragsdale, Jr., The Buffalo River. A Jurisprudence of Preservation, 21
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 429 (1994).
" See John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause,
18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 7 (1993).
" W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 88A, at
630 (5th ed. 1984). The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines private nuisance as "a non-
trespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1978).
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destroyed the value of a neighbor's land.76 Similarly, in the realm of public
nuisance, the enjoyment of the natural environment, without depletion of
ozone and with temperatures within otherwise normal limits, would seem to
constitute "a right common to the general public,"'77 and thus subject to
injunction and damages. Therefore, at first glance, nuisance law would seem
a promising field for imposition of environmental liability.
Nuisance law cannot fulfill this promise, however. In the first place,
such suits today are not likely to survive preemption defenses.78 But even if
they did, the actions ultimately would fail on the merits. This is because,
unfortunately, no one defendant, or group of defendants, could be shown to
be directly and uniquely responsible for the condition of the earth's
environment, and no plaintiff is blameless.79 In sociological terms, what
everyone is responsible for, no one is responsible for.
The broadest substantive area of law that could be thought relevant
to the coming environmental crisis is federal and state constitutional law. In
order to analyze constitutional issues in the environmental area, two
distinctions must be noted. First, one can look at constitutional law as both
a positive and negative environmental force as those terms were defined
above.8' Negative uses of constitutional law include such doctrines as
standing and takings of private property without just compensation. Here,
76 See, e.g., St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 11 H.L.C. 642 (1865) (holding copper
smelting operation liable for damages diminishing the value of a neighbor's land).
"' The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a public nuisance as "an unreasonable
interference with a right common to the general public." RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS,
supra note 75, § 821B.
" See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (finding that Federal Clean
Water Act preempts federal common law nuisance action for interstate water pollution); see
also International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (holding Federal Clean Water
Act to partially preempt state common law nuisance).
9 This is similar to the reasons why, ninety years ago, the State of Missouri was unable
to obtain injunctive relief against Chicago's dumping of raw sewage into a tributary of the
Mississippi River; Missouri itself permitted some such discharge, and it was uncertain whose
sewage caused the complained of health effects. See Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496
(1906).
'0 See supra Part II.C.
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however, we are looking for positive environmental uses of constitutional
law. A positive use of constitutional law would be one that authorizes or
even mandates public action to protect the environment. The second
distinction is the related point that there is a difference between authorizing
public action and mandating it. The most important constitutional issue, as
we shall see, is the question of mandating public action.
In terms of authorizing legislative action by the states, the significance
of the coming environmental catastrophe is that public initiatives designed
to protect us from it are clearly authorized by the police power. Of course,
such initiatives must be consistent with individual constitutional rights, but
that is true of all government action within our system. The only
constitutional limit that has emerged particularly in the area of state
environmental legislation is that such legislation cannot deal with
environmental problems by discriminating against the interests of citizens of
other states.8'
In terms of permissible Congressional legislation, there has been little
question since Hodel v. Indiana82 that Congress can act under the Interstate
Commerce Power83 to protect the environment. The recent challenge to
Commerce Clause jurisprudence implicit in United States v. Lopez,84 while
significant in other ways, is not sufficiently foundational to impinge on
Congress' environmental powers. In the environmental field, both economic
effects and interstate movement, which Lopez may be read to require, almost
always are present. One structural constitutional limitation on Congress that
has emerged, in a fashion similar to the anti-discrimination principle at the
"I See Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992) (finding
hazardous waste disposal fee for hazardous waste generated outside state unconstitutional);
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (finding the exclusion of out-of-
state garbage from private landfills unconstitutional). The same rule applies to
discrimination at the local level. See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't.
of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353 (1992) (finding state ban on accepting waste from
outside county unconstitutional).
2 452 U.S. 314 (1981) (upholding broad federal strip mine restoration legislation).
83 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
' 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (finding federal legislation regulating guns in school zones
unconstitutional).
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state level, is the prohibition on mandatory federal use of state officials to
carry out federal policy. 5 But this is a limitation on how, not whether,
Congress can act. It is not an important impediment to federal environmental
policy.
Thus, it appears that at the federal and state levels, sufficient
government power exists to take action to deal with the environmental crisis,
as long as such actions satisfy constitutional protections for individual rights,
notably the takings clause. Radical action has not taken place, however, to
address the danger we are in. Worse, some actions taken by government,
such as road building, themselves contribute to the environmental crisis. A
constitutional question thus presents itself-is there a constitutional principle
under which the legislative branches of government could be bound by the
courts in the area of the environment as they are, for example, in the area of
free speech? That is, is there, or could there be, a fundamental right to a
healthy environment?
Fundamental rights in constitutional law are those rights with which
the government may not interfere without some extraordinary justification.86
Fundamental rights have been both textual and non-textual.87  A
constitutional right to a healthy environment theoretically could operate to
prevent the government from harming the environment. It could, however,
operate in a different way. Such a right might be used to force the
government to legislate or regulate in order to protect the environment more
aggressively than it does currently. We will call the first use of a
fundamental right a passive right and the second, an affirmative right.
" See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding mandatory "take title"
provision directed to states unconstitutional).
86 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See generally Francis Barry McCarthy, The Confused
Constitutional Status and Meaning of Parental Rights, 22 GA. L. REV. 975, 980-83 (1988).
87 Some scholars use the term "noninterpretive." See, e.g., Ira Lupu, Constitutional
Theory and the Search for the Workable Premise, 8 DAYTON L. REV. 579, 583 (1983).
Although, as Ronald Dworkin has said, the idea that there are interpretations of the
constitutional text that are really interpretations and interpretations that are not really
interpretations is "unintelligible." Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and
How Roe Should be Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 387-88 (1992).
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In terms of a passive right to a healthy environment, the courts have
not interpreted the Federal Constitution to contain such a guarantee. Thus,
today, there is no constitutional ground, other than perhaps rational basis
review, upon which to challenge any government action allegedly harming
the environment.
Furthermore, given the controversy that Roe v. Wade88 has stirred
over non-textual rights, such a passive environmental right is unlikely to be
inferred in the near future. The criticism of "finding" rights that are not "in"
the Constitution has made the courts more cautious in recent years about such
implications.89 In addition to this general judicial reluctance, a right to a
healthy environment is a poor candidate for judicial recognition as a
fundamental right because it lacks aspects of "personal autonomy" and
"independence" that one may attribute to the word "liberty" in the due
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." One may say, of
course, that without a healthy environment, nothing recognizable as liberty
is possible. This certainly is true, and the authors would be moved by such
an argument, but the courts today would not be.
These conclusions are all the more certain in the realm of a possible
affirmative use of a constitutional right to a clean environment to force the
government affirmatively to protect the environment. If it is unlikely that a
passive right to a healthy environment would be recognized by the courts, it
is inconceivable that the present United States Supreme Court would
countenance judicial oversight of legislative and executive efforts to protect
the environment to ensure that such efforts go far enough. Even in the realm
of the acknowledged constitutional right of abortion, the Court never has held
8 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
89 This caution helps to explain the Supreme Court's unwillingness to recognize a
fundamental right in the context of state laws criminalizing consensual homosexual sexual
relations in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), its inability to forge clear guidance
in cases about .the substantive rights of involuntarily-committed mentally retarded persons
in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), and persons in a permanent vegetative state
in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
90 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 99 (1990).
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that there exists an affirmative right to government assistance.9 Furthermore,
the Court stopped short of finding affirmative rights to other sorts of
governmental aid in the early 1970s.92
The irony of these observations about the federal constitution and the
environment is that the same conclusions could be drawn about the state
constitutions, although some state constitutional texts encompass an
environmental constitutional right.93 Even in Pennsylvania, where the state
constitution clearly grants a right to a healthy environment, 94 courts have not
required any more of the government than compliance with all applicable
statutory provisions when the government itself acts in ways that might
threaten the environment. 95 The Pennsylvania courts have never relied on the
state constitution to force the government to regulate more aggressively to
protect the environment. Surprisingly, state constitutions have proven no
more significant to the protection of the environment than has the Federal
Constitution.96
9' See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
9 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (finding no
fundamental right to education in the context of a school funding challenge).
" See Bruce Ledewitz, The Challenge of and Judicial Response to, Environmental
Provisions in State Constitutions, 4 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CONST. L. 33 (1991).
9' Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides as follows:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to
the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and
esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's
public natural resources are the common property of all
the people, including generations yet to come. As
trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the
people.
9 See Ledewitz, supra note 93, at 69-75.
9' A potential exception to this statement is the public trust doctrine, under which states
are deemed to hold title to certain natural resources in trust for their citizens. See generally
Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970). In 1983, the California Supreme Court
overturned the traditional preference for established private uses of navigable watercourses
in favor of public uses. See National Audubon Soc. v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal.
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While constitutional law has not played a positive role in protecting
the environment, it has, unfortunately, played a role in burdening
governmental efforts to provide environmental protection. Two
constitutional law doctrines have been utilized by private interests to restrict
environmental protections: standing and takings. It appears to us, however,
that as presently construed, neither doctrine significantly limits the power of
the government to deal with the coming environmental catastrophe.
The standing case most often relied upon to limit private party access
to the federal courts to enforce environmental regulations and statutes is
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.97 In Lujan, the Supreme Court denied
members of an environmental organization standing to challenge the decision
of the Secretary of the Interior that Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act
applies only to actions within the United States.98 At first glance, Lujan
appears to be an insignificant limit on standing. The plaintiffs sued only to
require consultation between the Secretary of the Interior and other
government agencies to ensure that agency action abroad would not further
endanger the survival of endangered species. 99 In the two sections of the
1983). Unlike other constitutional, or quasi-constitutional, rights, the public trust doctrine
has the potential to create enforceable legal rights of private citizens to sue to enforce the
public's interest as well as create a legal duty in the state to preserve natural resources. See
Anna R.C. Caspersen, Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Impossibility of
"Takings " by Wildlife, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 357, 358 (1996).
Nevertheless, the public trust doctrine has not played a role in dealing with the
coming environmental crisis. In the first place, the doctrine always has applied to traditional
natural resources. Lawyers, being scientifically illiterate for the most part, have to our
knowledge never even asked courts to treat stratospheric ozone and the global climate as
natural resources. Habitat, or wilderness, might be a more likely source for a broader natural
resource conception. Even here, the public trust doctrine has never applied to private
property as such. In any event, the public trust doctrine has not yet achieved wide application
even in the field of traditional natural resources, such as water rights. See Michael C. Blum
& Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in Western Water, 37 ARIZ. L.
REv. 701 (1995).
9' 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
9' See id.
" See id. at 558.
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opinion that reflect a majority holding,'0° Justice Scalia wrote that the
plaintiffs lacked standing because they could not show that they would be
directly affected by the possible elimination of certain animal species in
particular foreign locations."'0 The plaintiffs did not claim that they would
visit the particular area within a certain time. 0 2 A desire to study the animals
in question was held not to be enough, by itself, to establish standing. A
plaintiff must be able to show how he or she will be affected by the alleged
unlawful conduct.'0 3 Justice Scalia also rejected the claim that a procedural
injury, such an allegedly unlawful decision not to consult with the Secretary,
could be enforced by anyone.'O° Procedural rights are "special" in the sense
that if a procedural right is ignored, an affected party has standing
notwithstanding the fact that the government's compliance with procedure
might not change the content of the resulting decision.0 5 But the plaintiff
still must be able to show that the decision that was taken without proper
procedure itself, affected the plaintiff. Otherwise, the plaintiff would be
attempting to vindicate the interest that all citizens have in ensuring that the
government operates according to law. But that interest never has been held
to be sufficient to ground standing.
There is no obvious reason why Lujan should be considered to be
relevant to the context of laws attempting to deal with the coming
environmental crisis. To see this, imagine that dramatic legislation were
enacted to prevent further global warming. Imagine also, that the legislation
contained the same sort of general standing provisions that were present in
Lujan. A plaintiff trying to enforce the provisions of this hypothetical statute
would be able to assert that he or she is "directly affected" by the
threat-global warming-that the statute is designed to assuage. Of course,
everyone on earth is affected directly by this particular threat, but widespread
'o On the merits, Justice Scalia wrote for a majority only in sections III-A and IV.
101 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734
(1972)).
02 See id. at 564.
03 See id. at 563.
104 See id. at 572.
s See id. at 572 n.7.
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harms can ground standing.' °6
In addition, even if standing limits did prove difficult to satisfy, that
would narrow only the opportunities for private enforcement of
environmental statutes and regulations. Administrative enforcement and
even criminal enforcement still would be available. So standing is not truly
a problem. The constitutional doctrine that is considered a serious threat to
environmental protection is not standing, but rather the takings clause. 07
In the takings area, as in standing, there is a recent case capable of
expansion in the future, but which as yet, is not that significant. In the area
of takings, that case is Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.'°8  In
Lucas, the plaintiff bought two residential lots on a South Carolina barrier
island, intending to build single family homes. At the time of the purchase,
the lots were not subject to South Carolina's coastal building permit
system.' 9 Subsequent to the sale, however, the State enacted new legislation
that barred the plaintiff from erecting any permanently habitable structures
on the property. 10 The plaintiff sued on the ground that the new legislation
deprived him of all economically viable use of the property, thus constituting
a taking. The Supreme Court agreed.'
" "While it does not matter how many persons have been injured by the challenged
action, the party bringing suit must show that the action injures him in a concrete and
personal way." Id. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
But cf. Florida Audubon Soc. v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 667, n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("[T]he
plaintiff must show that he is not simply injured as is everyone else, lest the injury be too
general for court action.").
'07 The Fifth Amendment to U.S. Constitution provides in part: "nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just compensation." The requirement of just
compensation applies to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978).
'08 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
'09 See id. at 1008.
'" See id. at 1009.[it See id. at 1019.
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The decision in Lucas has excited a great deal of comment,"' but
because the Court's holding will only apply where the government has denied
all economically viable use of a plaintiffs land, it will not affect most
governmental action, even in the face of looming environmental catastrophe.
Because of that narrow context, the case is of limited direct significance." 3
Indeed, Justice Scalia's opinion in Lucas specifically noted that "categorical
treatment" of takings claims that avoids "case-specific inquiry into the public
interest advanced in support of the restraint" is limited to two instances:
"physical 'invasion' of... property" and the situation in Lucas itself--denial
of "all economically beneficial or productive use of land." ' 4 The opinion
pointedly did not criticize, even impliedly, the outcomes of prior case-
specific analyses.'
Of course, the Court's interpretation of the takings clause is very
much in flux. The Lucas opinion itself will come to mean a great deal more
if the Court decides to apply its analysis to portions of an owner's land rather
112 See, e.g., Hope M. Babcock, Has the U.S. Supreme Court Finally Drained the
Swamp of Takings Jurisprudence?: The Impact ofLucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
on Wetlands and Coastal Barrier Beaches, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. I (1995); William W.
Fisher, III, The Trouble with Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (1993); Robert M. Washburn,
Land Use Control, the Individual, and Society: Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
52 MD. L. REV. 162 (1993).
"3 See Richard C. Ausness, Regulatory Takings and Wetland Protection in the Post-
Lucas Era, 30 LAND & WATER L. REV. 349 (1995).
"[There is] no doubt Lucas will force governments to compensate property
owners when wetland regulations strip the land of all economic value; but
in such cases, the government ought to pay. On the other hand, Lucas
does not pose much of a threat to wetland protection regulations that
recognize the interests of landowners as well as the needs of the
environment."
Id. at 351. See Glenn P. Sugameli, Takings Issues in the Light of Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, A Decision Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying Nothing, 12 VA. ENVTL. L.
J. 439 (1993), for a different view of why Lucas may not have much effect.
"4 505 U.S. at 1015.
" Professor Richard A. Epstein even reads Lucas as adopting "a powerful 'hands off
attitude to all forms of partial restrictions on land use--a subject that dwarfs the importance
of the peculiar circumstances of Lucas." Epstein, Yee v. City of Escondido: The Supreme
Court Strikes Out Again, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 3, 4 (1992).
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than all of it." 6 Furthermore, in the area of public access to private land,
which is not likely to be directly at issue when the government restricts
development to protect the environment, 17 the Court certainly has been
pursuing a more pro-private property approach." 8 The time may come,
perhaps soon, when takings law really becomes an active impediment to
protecting us from the coming environmental catastrophe. We do not think,
however, that time has arrived yet.
What has emerged from this excursion through law's responses to the
environmental crisis is that there has been no consistent response. Law today
neither recognizes a crisis and deals with it, nor denies the existence of the
crisis. Furthermore, it does not courageously protect individual rights against
government intrusion in the face of crisis. We could call law at this moment
not quite irrelevant, but almost.
There are, however, other important aspects of law beyond what
lawyers say. Thus far, we have dealt with what the law says expressly, in its
authoritative voice. We now turn to the meanings law implies.
III. THE POLITICAL RHETORIC OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
As this article is being prepared, attention is focused on the case of
Bernadine Suitum, an 82-year-old widow who has become a symbol for the
property rights movement in the United States." 9 Mrs. Suitum wanted to
build a retirement home on the shore of Lake Tahoe, but her plans were
blocked by the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, which deemed her property
a wetland area important to protecting the lake. Unlike the plaintiff in Lucas,
Mrs. Suitum has not been deprived of all economic benefit from the land
t See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016-17 n.7.
"7 If the government restricts a landowner's development options only to grant access
to the public, one may ask whether environmental protection was the true goal of the
restriction.
11 See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (finding unconstitutional a
city's policy of requiring a landowner to dedicate a portion of her property in flood plain as
a public greenway).
"' See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l. Planning Agency, 80 F.3d 359 (9th Cir. 1996).
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because of the possibility of sale of transferable development rights. The
case was argued before the Supreme Court on February 26, 1997.120
It is not clear whether the Supreme Court will decide any important
takings issues in Mrs. Suitum's case. In her case, the district court
concluded, and the Ninth Circuit panel agreed, that the case was not ripe
because she had not applied for transfers of development rights. 2 ' The
Justices were widely reported to have been sympathetic during oral argument
to having Mrs. Suitum's claim adjudicated on the merits. 122
Mrs. Suitum's case is an important aspect of the vigorous private
property rights movement in the United States. In recent years, wise-use and
allied groups have grown into a national political force.12 1 Such groups have
won a number of legislative victories either restricting government authority
to interfere with property rights or requiring the payment of compensation for
regulatory limitations on property prerogatives. 124
Environmentalists have become alarmed at the arrival of this
movement and have sought to counter it, without much success. Professor
Gerald Torres expressed this frustration in a recent essay, 125 asking "How
have [property rights] proponents been able to weave a socially and legally
compelling story?"' 126 Thus, Torres concedes, as anyone must, that the private
property story in America recently has been, and probably always has been,
politically compelling.' 27 Torres sees that the property rights phenomenon is
20 See Justices Get Impatient Over Delay in Landowner Suit, THE LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 27, 1997, available in Lexis, News Library, LGLINT File [hereinafter
Justices Get Impatient].
2 See Suitum, 80 F.3d at 362.
122 Justice O'Connor's comment from the bench was reported as: "My goodness, why
not give this poor elderly woman the right to go to court?" Justices Get Impatient, supra
note 120.
2' See, e.g., William L. Inden, Compensation Legislation: Private Property Rights vs.
Public Benefits, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. POL. 119 (1996).
24 See generally id.
123 See Gerald Torres, Taking and Giving: Police Power, Public Value, and Private
Right, 26 ENVTL. L. 1 (1996).
126 Id. at 10.
27 See id. at 8.
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not strictly legal, but is a political and narrative event.128
The takings clause is very important to the property rights movement,
but it does not function in that context as a legal norm. Rather, the takings
clause functions as an organizing framework for a constitutional vision
independent of what judges and law professors think and say. So, Mrs.
Suitum's case to the contrary notwithstanding, courts are not crucial to the
private property movement.
Professor Torres sums up the basic arguments'29 of the property rights
movement as follow:
1) Property ownership is tied to political power. The right to
own real property is, in fact, the basic right. It undergirds all
civil rights and civil liberties.
2) The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution directly limits the power of the state to
expropriate private property unless those owners are
compensated at the unregulated exchange value of the
property.
3) Because of this limitation, the state is using regulation to
achieve without compensation what the Constitution would
prohibit if the government acted directly.
4) This move is a deliberate attempt to expand the power of
the state at the expense of property owners and to the
detriment of all citizens.
5) The regulatory zeal of the state "makes enemies of the
majority of Americans" and is part of the mistaken belief that
the government can do things better than people can.
28 See id. at 14-24.
129 See id. at 9.
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6) Any government action that limits development potential
of real property, where that action is not aimed at preventing
an immediate public harm, is a compensable taking.
Compensation is required regardless of the value left in the
parcel after the regulation is enacted or the reciprocal benefit
conferred by the limitation.
7) The environmental motivation behind much of the
regulation of private property is antihuman 30 (footnote
omitted).
The reader can see how significant the takings clause is in this list.
But this takings clause is in no sense based on what courts have said about it.
For that matter, the movement's interpretation is not based on history or text.
The model for what is happening with regard to the takings clause
was recently and effectively described by Professor James Pope, who traced
through the 1930's what he called, "Labor's Constitution of Freedom."' 3,
According to Professor Pope, union activists had their own view of what the
Constitution promised and, in effect, created an alternative narrative
universe. '32
Professor Pope's model can be seen at work in a number of disparate
political movements in both America's past and present. A good example is
the National Rifle Association ("NRA") and the Second Amendment. t33
130 Torres, supra note 125, at 9. The word, "antihuman," is a quote from an article by
Nancie Marzulla, The Property Rights Movement: How It Began and Where It Is Headed,
in LAND RIGHTS, 1, 24-25 (Bruce Yandel ed., 1995).
'3t See James Gray Pope, Labor's Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941 (1997).
' See id. at 943.
'1 For mainstream accounts of the National Rifle Association's interpretation of the
Second Amendment (usually not too sympathetic to the NRA), see Byron L. Beck, Second
Amendment Militias Searching for Modern Day Redcoats Along the Shifting Rhetorical
Battle Lines of a Gun Controlled Utopia, 21 W. ST. U. L. REV. 415 (1994); Andrew D. Herz,
Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness and Dereliction of Dialogic Responsibility,
75 B.U. L. REV. 57 (1995); and David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and the Second
Amendment Revolution: Conjuring With the People, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 879 (1996).
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Another example is the death penalty abolition movement and the Eighth
Amendment.'34 In a similar fashion, Professor Robert Cover earlier described
slavery abolitionists as "constitutional utopians."' 35
One way to tame such creativity with legal texts is to bring a
movement's vision into the courtroom. Confrontation with legal institutions
tends to deaden textual creativity.'36 The movements whose interpretations
fare best politically, as the rhetorical success of the NRA shows, are the ones
that stay out of law's institutional structure.
Another way to counter such constitutional creativity is with an
alternative constitutional account-often one backed by the overwhelming
power of the cultural elite-as in the case of the opponents of labor.' But
in forging an alternative constitutional account, the "other" group, in our case
environmentalists, has the same problem of resisting judicial interpretive
frameworks. Unfortunately, the environmental movement, concerned with
countering Supreme Court opinions, has not yet engaged in popularly
accessible interpretation in regard to the takings clause.
It is possible, for example, to oppose the narrative of the property
rights movement with an account of nuisance law and property law as a
traditional exception to the takings clause. 3' The message is that nuisance
and related doctrines have been flexible concepts and that there is no
114 See HUGO ADAM BEDAU, DEATH IS DIFFERENT, 92-128 (1987); Bruce Ledewitz,
Could the Death Penalty Be a Cruel Punishment? 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 121 (1993);
Margaret Jane Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989 (1978).
'3 See ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 154-158 (1975).
"6 Calling this process "creativity" depends on one's point of view. It could be said
of the NRA, for example, that its interpretive fancy is just irresponsible. See Torres supra
note 125 at 9. On the other hand, a creative thinker like Hugo Bedau inevitably will examine
a constitutional concept like "cruel and unusual punishments... quite apart from attending
centrally to the issues as they have been shaped during the past decade or so by the Supreme
Court's own pronouncements..." BEDAU, supra note 134, at 128. In a democracy as
strongly influenced by the courts as this one, there is a strong tendency to defer to judges'
interpretations of constitutional texts.
137 See Pope, supra note 131, at 984-88.
"' See Babcock, supra note 112, at 3; John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of
Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 17 (1993).
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justifiable ground upon which to limit them to pre-existing common law
outcomes, as the majority in Lucas seems to do. 3 9 This strategy is legally
necessary to counter the Supreme Court's artificial limitation in Lucas on a
traditional exception to the requirement of compensation for even total loss
of value of land. This sort of argument attempts to retain the possibility of
serious legislative efforts to protect environmentally sensitive land in the face
of a somewhat hostile Supreme Court. Politically speaking, however, this
is not an interpretation of the takings clause at all.
In order to understand this, imagine speaking about takings in the
context of Mrs. Suitum's land. Mrs. Suitum wants to build a normal house
on a lake. No matter how one puts it, Mrs. Suitum's house is not a nuisance.
Nor does it interfere with any background property principles, at least not as
people generally understand their property rights. Building a house on a lake
is something many Americans have done and, unless terms are to lose all
normal meaning, calling this activity a nuisance or the violation of a public
trust, even as an analogy, would be politically incoherent to any intended
audience. This is why Mrs. Suitum's lawyers, savvy representatives of the
politically committed Pacific Legal Foundation, say: "Mrs. Suitum has done
nothing wrong .... She hasn't violated any permit requirements. She hasn't
violated any environmental laws. She hasn't harmed sensitive wetlands or
endangered species. She hasn't done anything except apply for a permit to
build one modest home.' ' 40
This is effective rhetoric because it locates the claims of the property
rights movement squarely within the Western tradition of individual
autonomy, and hence individual liberty, and therefore can unselfconsciously
ask for compensation. Mrs. Suitum, it says to the American people, has done
nothing but what you all have done.
' In Lucas, the Court acknowledged that no compensation needs to be paid in the case
of prohibition of "harmful or noxious" uses of land. See 505 U.S. at 1022. Justice Scalia's
majority opinion did not limit the principle of non-compensation to regulation of traditional
nuisances, but.did restrict non-compensation in the case of the loss of all economic value to
a "pre-existing limitation upon the landowner's title." Id. at 1028-29.
140 Fredreka Schouten, Property Rights and Government Collide in Court, USA
TODAY, Feb. 24, 1997, at 3A (quoting R.S. Radford).
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Is there a story for understanding the takings clause that would deny
compensation to Mrs. Suitum and make a politically coherent environmental
statement? It would have to be a story that rings true, even if it is, at first,
unpopular. There is such a story and it is one that the property rights
movement already attributes to environmentalists. It is the story of the harm
humans do.
Despite the view of Chief Justice Rehnquist to the contrary,141 it
generally has been accepted that government may regulate to reduce or
eliminate harm to the public interest and that when doing so reduces property
value, no compensation need be paid. 42 Justice Scalia's opinion in Lucas
acknowledges this tradition and does not entirely reject it.' 43 The problem
with that approach, according to Justice Scalia, is that all human activity can
be characterized as harmful. Thus, if harm prevention were all a legislature
needed to avoid paying compensation, compensation would never be paid,
except in the case of "stupid staff,"' 44 that is, a staff too stupid to figure out
how to call their law harm prevention.
This "if-we-allow-this-then-the-'limit'-is-no-limit" argument should
sound familiar to anyone who has read United States v. Lopez, 45 the case
that held that Congress could not prohibit guns in schoolyards under the
Commerce Power. Lopez did not actually teach anything about the limit of
the Commerce Power except that if the law at issue were permitted, there
would be no limit. Similarly, Lucas teaches us little about takings except that
if the legislature takes all value, there generally will have to be compensation.
These cases are about line drawing and nothing else.
If Justice Scalia had wanted to, we think he could have said
something meaningful in Lucas about the nature of harm. For one thing, it
is not actually true that all human activity can be persuasively characterized
'4' For an account of Chief Justice Rehnquist's view, see PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note
32, at 1016-17.
42 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022 (stating that no compensation need be paid in order to
prohibit harmful uses of land).
'41 See id. at 1015-1019.
'" See id. at 1026 n.12.
145 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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as harmful.'46 Sometimes it is the case that the legislature will be distributing
a benefit rather than preventing a harm. That was the situation, for example,
in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,'47 where the evident purpose of
the easement across the landowner's beachfront property was to distribute to
the public that which the landowner owned, a great view and access to the
ocean. 
48
It is not difficult to see that the planned house in the Lucas case might
actually harm a fragile beach. No one wants what the landowner has. No
park is planned there. This human activity is potentially truly harmful.
We do not see anything in the Lucas opinion that questions the harm
that building this house may cause. Two factors were relied on by the Court
to establish that building the house was not nuisance-like. One factor was
that this type of building "has long been engaged in by similarly situated
owners" and the other was that "similarly situated" owners still are permitted
to build.'49 In other words, other humans have harmed the environment in
this way before, and they still do. What prevents the Court from
acknowledging a broad principle that harm is the limit of compensation is not
that so much human activity can be characterized falsely as harmful, but that
so much human activity is, in fact, harmful.
Mrs. Suitum's proposed house is another good example of the harm
that ordinary private property use can cause. Her house is not a nuisance, but
rather, it is simply a harm. In addition, it is a harm not because there is
something wrong with the house, not because the site is particularly sensitive,
and not because the area is so densely populated. Mrs. Suitum's proposed
house causes harm because she is a human being, and human beings,
particularly in the industrialized West, do not live in harmony with the
natural order. That is why each one of us always wants to own the last house
developed on Lake Tahoe.
In the most elementary economic/Kantian sense, we all want a free
t4 Justice Scalia states that one cannot distinguish harm from benefit "on an objective,
value-free basis . . . " Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026.
14' 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
148 See id.
149 See 505 U.S. at 1031.
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ride for ourselves, yet at the same time, we want to act differently from the
way we want others to act. We want the right to cut down trees while we
continue to breathe oxygen created by the trees of others. We want to have
a beautiful view of a lake though our homes detract from just that beauty by
adding runoff to the lake. We are used to thinking of our ordinary activities
as benign, as they once were, in effect. When there were fewer people, we
could ignore the ordinary harms of private property and speak legally as if we
caused no harm. Now our harms accumulate. 50
The principle of fundamental human harm is one that the
environmental movement could present to the American people. The
message would be that new development entails significant harm even when
it is just an "ordinary" use of private property. The world cannot afford the
loss of trees, the new roads, the demand for water, the destruction of cropland
and so forth. Any development that does not utilize existing facilities will
have to be considered proscribable without compensation.' 5' This does not
mean that development will stop. There are places where the activity of
people does not harm the earth. But those are places people already occupy
and are within the limits of what people already do.
The harm principle we are outlining here is just what is meant by
calling environmentalists "antihuman."' Professor Torres calls that claim
"rather incredible,"'53 but we think we understand it. The question is whether
one thinks that people are ruining the world. We do.
Law does not, perhaps cannot, accept the principle of human harm.
This is consistent with law's enthrallment with the human, which is a
commitment that is narcissistic in comportment and indifferent to nature in
practice. Since we think that law cannot respond to the coming
environmental catastrophe without examining that world view, we end this
"' "Now it is clear that with ceaseless repetition, even seemingly innocuous actions
such as driving a car or cutting down a tree can influence the physical and chemical systems
that govem the earth." CHERYL SIMON SILVER, ONE EARTH ONE FUTURE: OUR CHANGING
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT (1991).
s ' The actual decision to regulate or proscribe, however, would lie with the legislature.
112 See supra note 130.
"' Torres, supra note 125, at 9 n.37.
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paper with a few words about law's fundamental assumptions.
IV. LAW'S THEOLOGY AND THE COMING ENVIRONMENTAL CATASTROPHE
Like the student in the book, Ishmael, who insisted that the West has
no myths,'54 we expect to hear that law does not have a theology. If by
theology one means the traditional concept of God, that is so. American law
has been rigorously secular for most of the twentieth century.
If we mean by theology, an account of what is most real in the
universe, then of course law has such an account. The most pervasive aspect
of law's theology is a thoroughly anthropocentric world view. We do not
mean by this that the environment has been granted no protection by law.
Law's perspective about the environment, however, emphasizes the
importance of the environment to humans. A representative example of this
theology at work is Professor James Huffman's largely critical review of
Vice-President Al Gore's book, Earth in the Balance.'55 Huffman entitles his
review, Civilization in the Balance. Thus, Huffnan wants to set man and his
works--"Civilization"-in contrast and opposition to "Earth." On one level,
this is pretty funny. It is as if humans knew how to build "Civilization"
somewhere else, and just happen to be on Earth for the time being. On a
deeper level, we see here the resistance to any suggestion that nature has
claims of its own and that we, ourselves, are part of nature.
Law had an opportunity to adopt a nature-based perspective in 1972.
In Sierra Club v. Morton, '56 members of the Sierra Club who favored leaving
Mineral King Valley in an undeveloped state brought suit to challenge the
decision of the United States Forest Service approving a ski resort
development project. The Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing.'57
In his justly famed dissent in that case, Justice William Douglas proposed
' See DANIEL QUNN, ISHMAEL 45 (1992) ("As far as I know, there's nothing in our
culture that could be called mythology .... ").
15 See supra note 30.
156 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
' See id. at 740.
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that nature be permitted to sue in court for its own protection,"' a perspective
that has been rejected thoroughly by the Court. Today we can see Justice
Douglas' wisdom, for it is clear that the abstract and artificial quality of
standing cases like Lujan comes about just because endangered species are
not able to sue for themselves, even though it is specifically law's intention
to protect them.
Even within the anthropocentric perspective of law, not all views are
alike. The most human-centered view is that of law and economics, which
defines environmental problems as a situation in which "one or more
resources is not being used so as to maximize human satisfactions." '59 It may
be that the environmental crisis we face cannot be addressed without a
healthy dose of private market principles-indeed that is likely the case. A
mind set, however, that sees the entire universe in terms of human
satisfactions, is not going to see well enough to save itself, no matter how
efficient its tools. 16
0
Other current views within the legal community, although much more
sensitive to the qualities of nature than law and economics view tends to be,
still judge nature from a human perspective.161 Thus, we are told to protect
the environment because of the qualities it embodies, 162 or because of our
obligation to the next generation,163 or, most beautifully we think, because
58 See id. at 741; see also Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-
Toward Legal Rights For Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972).
"' WILLIAM E. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS? THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION
17(1974).
6 There are, of course, other voices within the world of economics. See, e.g., Kenneth
E. Boulding, The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth, in ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
IN A GROWING ECONOMY 3 (Henry Jarrett ed., 1971).
161 We realize that nature-based perspectives do exist outside law. See, e.g., Lynn
White, Jr., Continuing the Conversation, in WESTERN MAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
55 (lan G. Barbour ed., 1973).
62 See Mark Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Environment, 84 YALE L.J. 205, 248
(1974).
6' See Edith Brown Weiss, Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations For the
Environment, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 198 (1990).
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humans are members of a community of life."4
All these anthropocentric perspectives share an important flaw. They
tend toward ethics of a distasteful type. They ask whether we should impose
burdens on people that they do not want to bear because of the particular
moral views of the one doing the proposing. Inevitably, these perspectives
end in moral carping.
On the other hand, anthropocentric views are not all bad. An
anthropocentric view might be advantageous in the face of the coming
environmental disaster. After all, nature does not have an environmental
crisis, humans do. Elevated temperatures, thinned ozone, expanded deserts,
deforestation, and so forth will not end life on earth. The earth is likely to
have millions and perhaps billions of years in which to evolve new forms of
life after humans are extinct; but humans are not likely to flourish or even
cope well with the conditions that are coming.
An anthropocentric view should be able to recognize this and take the
necessary steps. Indeed, as conditions worsen in the next century,
environmental preservation probably will come to be seen not as a matter of
ethics at all, but as a matter of simple human survival. So law may turn out
to have an honored place in the natural history of planet earth. Its
anthropocentrism may alert it to danger, but we see few signs of such
awareness.
We could end here, with a hope that humanity will act in time to
prevent disaster. We must add, however, that we are not really satisfied with
the thought that eventually humans in general and law in particular will wake
up and take steps to ameliorate the environmental crisis. Aside from the fact
that the awakening may come too late, without more action, humans still will
fail to acknowledge their absolute and unalterably inextricable dependence
on nature.' It is in that refusal that the seed of the next disaster germinates.
What is lacking in these anthropocentric accounts is a sense that the
'64 See ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE
viii (1987).
165 Now here, in humankind's inexorable dependence upon nature, which is a given of
human experience, is the "objective, value-free" perspective Justice Scalia seeks. See Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992).
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unfolding environmental crises show that humans are being judged. This is
a religious perspective, whether the judgment is that of a personal God,
whose earth this is, or is a reflection of an impersonal structure of the way
things are, to which humans must ultimately submit, as indeed all the
universe submits. What else can you do with the way things are but
submit?'66
It is at just this point-the question whether humans are beyond being
judged-that we see the radical division between the secular and the
religious. That division is absolutely not a matter of creches and school
choice. It is a matter of a certain way of seeing reality. And on that divide,
law and lawyers, even some lawyers who champion religious rights, stand
totally on the secular side.
We will be reminded that far from containing the seed of rescue from
environmental catastrophe, the Judeo-Christian tradition has encouraged the
abuse of nature. 67 We are well aware of this, but are not dismayed. It is not
religion and tradition that are speedily destroying the capacity of the earth to
sustain human life. That indictment must be laid at the door of the heirs of
the enlightenment: science, economics, law and liberal government.
161
Perhaps when all admit their sin with regard to the earth, true healing will
take place.
166 We are saying that nature operates not unlike Emerson's suggestion in his great
essay, Compensation, in THE ESSAYS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 53 (The Belknap Press
1979).
117 See White, supra note 161.
168 This was Reinhold Niebuh's important criticism of the enlightenment roots of liberal
government, namely that this heritage is based on man's worship of self. See REINHOLD
NIEBUH, THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN 102 (1941).
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